Prussian Reform Plan
The Times wrote arrogantly: "The inference from these proceedings is that there is a fair chance the peace of Europe will not be violated. As for the precise degree in which the honour of the two antagonists is preserved, we profess very little anxiety indeed. The truth is the nature of the transaction leaves very little honour to be devided between these two great monarchies, for the quarrel is most vulgar, commonplace, and discreditable. ... The question is like most German quarrels; it rises into some degree of interest as soon as there is a chance of either party coming to blows, and subsides into tameness and insipidity as soon as the crisis has passed away."
As late as May 7 Gerlach wrote in the Kreuzzeitung in his remarkable style: "The Prussian demand for an expansion of power in Germany is justified; but so also is the Austrian appeal for the preservation of her power in Germany. This dualism is the vital basis, the real foundation, of the German Constitution. Germany ceases to be Germany without Prussia or without Austria. Prussia's hounour and power are therefore the pride of Germany, and Austria's honour and power are the pride of Prussia. To injure Prussia is to injure Austria, and to injure Austria is to injure Prussia." （目からジャガイモ……） Such appeals to tradition and to the days of the Holy Alliance were bound to have their effect on the King; and in the army, too, voices were raised against war with Austria, the old comrade-in-arms.
Throughout April feeling in Austria had been growing more bitter. With Prussia in alliance with Italy and demanding the exclusion of Austria from Germany war seemed inevitable. Peace could be had at a price; but Austria was too proud to surrender Schleswig-Holstein and acknowledge Prussian srpremacy in North Germany. The Germans in Austria were doubly embittered by this unjustifiable aggression; for if Bismarck succeeded they would be excluded from their German Fatherland. They would be the hardest hit by a German civil war, and all, liberals and clericals alike, hated the Prussian minister. The Slavs added to the hatred of Prussia their general hatred of everything German. The Magyars alone remained detached; but they too desired a war, because they hoped that it would compel the Monarchy to grant them their ancient liberties in return for their help. （扶额……所以说要不要这么抽搐啊）
Nevertheless it was Austria who precipitated the tragic drama of 1866. ... It has often been asked who was responsible for the Austrian measures which inevitably provoked war, but no satisfactory answer has been given. None of the ministers who advised the premature mobilisation which gave Italy and Prussia a pretext for war ever gave an explanation of their policy, chiefly because of their feeling for the Monarchy; they were anxious to avoid seperating the Emperor's share in events from their own. This sentiment was peculiar to Austria. In Prussia dynastic feeling was just as deeply rooted; yet there was no hesitation in examining the characters of Frederick William IV, William I, Frederick III, and William II. William I's share in the war of 1866 was fully analysed during his lifetime by some of his closest advisers; the King himself was often able to read that he had not the creative power of his great minister. In Austria such a thing was impossible; the personality of the head of the House of Habsburg was surrounded, during his lifetime, with a dim religious light, and any discussion of him as an historical character was forbidden by a powerful tradition, which went back to the days of Holy Roman Empire. It was bound up with the feeling that Austria-Hungary depended more than any other empire on the awe and respect felt for the Dynasty. This silence made the study of contemporary history difficult, but in the eyes of the leading statesmen that did not matter; it strengthened the foundations of the empire. （所谓南辕北辙还真是……不过贵族你跟普君也南辕北辙跟大姐也南辕北辙，到底是……orz。说实话看着各家国内都对开战争论不断犹豫不决，真是劳心劳力啊……）
On April 26, when it had been decided by the generals to mobilise on the northern front, Esterhazy writes to Mensdorff: "Our enemies have achieved their object. We are arming--and for a prolonged peace, which will probably compel us to fire the first shot! ... This war cannot be a defensive war, or still less a conservative war for us. You can console yourself with the thought that you have struggled bravely and with self-control for peace to the very last moment."
Friedjung may have lacked certain details or may even occasionally have been misinformed, but he went to the root of the matter when he pointed to the complete lack of co-ordination between the Ministers and the generals as the source of all Austria's mistakes and misfortunes.
Plans of Campaign. Benedek and Krismanic. Negotiations for the Surrender of Venice.
The Austrian generals had insisted on mobilisation, not because they were confident of victory, but because they doubted the military strength of the Empire. Just before the battle of Koeniggraetz, Mensdorff confessed to Motley that during the negotiations between Berlin and Vienna "the military authorities were very dissatisfied, and from the very start of the campaign expected their inadequate preparations to result in grave disaster". ... It is completely untrue that the Austrian generals were in favour of war in 1866 because they overrated the strength of the army. It was the diplomats who underrated the dangers. This situation recurs throughout Austrian history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in the wars against the French Republic and Napoleon. （所以说……这到底是图个啥啊= =）
Those responsible for Austrian policy between 1792 and 1866 were convinced that Austria, as the protector of conservative ideas, must always be ready to fight innovators and disturbers of the peace. But modern ideas were stronger than treaty rights, as the men of 1859 and 1866 had to learn. It is always dangerous for a state to think itself called upon to defend an ideal or divine order of things throughout the world, instead of putting its own interests first. （虽然不觉得那谁这么无私，不过单就这点表述上来看，还真是跟某时期的亲分一模一样……该说这是哈布斯堡血脉作祟吗？orz）... [Esterhazy and Biegeleben] did not realise that a storm was sweeping throughout Europe--a storm which was to destroy the German Confederation, the temporal power of the Papacy, and with them Austria's predominance in Germany, in Italy, and over Hungary. （所以说，时代不一样啦，落后于时代的小少爷。）
According to his own account, Bismarck made a further proposal: "I proposed that, fully equipped as we were, we should turn against France and compel her to surrender Alsace; Austria could then have had Strasburg and Prussia Mainz. ... Napoleon, with his army weak and demoralised by the Mexican expedition, could not have resisted." （虽然很对不起法叔，但是真的很想笑啊……有什么问题解决不了了就去打法叔么）
The Austrian attitude was fundamentally inconsistent: at the beginning of May the outlook had been so black that it had been decided to buy off Italy with the offer of Venice; since then nothing had changed except the mood of the Austrian Cabinet. The dilettantism with which the Belcredi Cabinet faced its problem, both at home and abroad, lay at the root of the evil. The internal situation should have made the ministers avoid war at all costs; instead they welcomed war as the solution of all their difficulties. （贵族你真是够了！上司们也真是够了！扶额……就说了要不要这么抽搐啊……在战术上倒是很不抽搐，完全不知变通嘛=。=）
Austria thus lost Venice whatever happened, and, if she was victorious, Napoleon was bound to benefit, even if he did not gain any territory. In return Austria received practically nothing; it was soon clear that she was not even assured of Italian neutrality. There was only a clause, by which the Austrian Cabinet set great store, guaranteeing the present possessions of the Holy See, and even allowing that under certain circumstances the Pope should regain his lost territory, the Marches and the Legations. ... But under no circumstances was the House of Habsburg to profit. The Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were never to return to their ancient possessions; at the most they might hope for compensation in Germany. Napoleon did not expect any reaction in Italy in favour of the Pope or of the Bourbons; but the strongly Clerical statesmen of Austria regarded this clause as a real achievement. The Austrian army in Italy would not be fighting for Austria, or even for the dynasty, but simply to secure for the peoples of Central Italy the right to rise in favour of the Pope. （何必呢你……= =||||）
Beust, who saw the treaty later, described it as the most incredible document he had ever seen, and we can only agree with him.
Bismarck was very annoyed at Manteuffel's moderation. "If only there had been an exchange of shots", he said impatiently to the Italian minister. But as La Marmora observed with justice: "I do not see how Manteuffel chould have fired on the Austrians, when they had retreated without fighting."
Bismarck exclaimed: "Our troops are even now marching into Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse. It will be a bloody struggle and perhaps Prussia will succumb, but whatever happens she will fight bravely and honourably. If we are defeated I shall not return here; I shall die in the last charge. You can only die once and death is better than defeat." （突然想起了前阵子看的小说……果然是好好地死么……）
The War of 1866 decisively settled the German question, because Austria accepted it as a final verdict on the history of three hundred years. This was the price of the long suppression of all freedom of thought and conscience which had followed the expulsion of the Protestants; exiles like Kepler and Amos Comenius could not be replaced by the pupils of the Jesuits. The province south of the Danube had been the only part of Germany to escape the ravages of the Thirty Years' War, but they had declined spiritually and economically ever since, while the rest of Germany had been slowly recovering. In consequence, when Maria Theresa and Joseph II set themselves to restore a shattered Austria, they had been hampered everywhere by the lack of competent assistants; in spite of this they had given the Monarchy such a renewal of strength that it had been able to withstand the storm of the French Revolution, while the Prussia of Frederick the Great had collapsed after Jena. But then under Francis I the empire had relapsed disastrously into the policy of repression. （萌哭了……曾经在不幸当中成了仅存的幸运儿，日后就要承受补偿这种幸运的不幸啊，这样的奥神罗真棒……[被揍了）
又看了点军事情况……贵族你这个平时没有预备役到了打起来了才开始慢吞吞地试图征预备役、家里的将领只会打防守反击一种战术的家伙，真是没救了（喂
Preparations for War
In embarking on negotiations with Italy, the King quietened his conscience with the assurance that they committed him to nothing, so long as he remained open to a compromise and did not present an ultimatum to Austria. Bismarck did not contradict his master; for he too would have preferred a voluntary surrender by Austria of supremacy in Northern Germany. But he was certain that Habsburg pride would prefer defeat to a voluntary surrender （内牛满面TvT）, and, more clear-sighted than the King, saw that the Italian alliance was a first step which would inevitably lead to war. Peace could only be maintained if the King moderated his claims, or gave way, as his brother Frederick William IV had done in 1850. But in 1850 William I too had preferred Olmutz to a war; and in consequence Bismarck's opponents at court fully expected the King to draw back at the last moment.
The result of the Prussian Council of Feburary 28 remained for the moment secret; had Austria known that William was negotiating with Italy and France to secure the overlordship of North Germany, she would at once have prepared to meet the threat. But a good deal was learnt of the Prussian plans through the personal relationships which connected the Prussian and the Austrian Courts （不是我说什么……personal relationships什么的，一家人就是分家也分不干净是吧）and from Bismarck himself, who made no secret of his intentions or of the King's opposition; but Austria had isolated herself during the Crimean War, and she seemed to have lost the art of winning allies. （每次看到众叛亲离没人要的贵族，俺都充满抖M的萌感……） Buol had left a grievous inheritance; and after his fall Austrian policy had changed almost every six months under the influence of first one minister and then another. Since the Meeting of the Princes at Frankfort Austrian policy had passed throught every gradation from a proud assertion of supremacy to a close alliance with Prussia, and was now back again on the verge of a quarrel. None of the leading men had been given time to carry a policy through to a finish. Schmerling's plans had been upset by Rechberg; and the influence of Schemerling and of Biegeleben had brought Rechberg down when he had almost succeeded in restoring the alliance with Prussia. Now Esterhazy was supreme; but he, unlike Schmerling and Rechberg, had no definite plan and could never pursue any one policy for long. The Cabinet of Vienna thus continued to be swayed to and fro by contradictory hopes and fears. （这还真是抖M啊……）
[Mensdorff, the Foreign Minister] "I did not invent the stupid Schleswig-Holstein question and am suffering for the sins of past years. Whether we shall get out of this most tedious of tedious questions without a conflict I cannot yet say..."
Esterhazy saw the possibilities of the situations clearly--too clearly, indeed; for Austria needed a man of decision, and not one who was torn by doubts. ... He regared the period of the Holy Alliance as the happiest in European history and therefore disliked the thought of a war between two of the conservative powers. He would rather have come to some agreement with Prussia regarding the supremacy in Germany; and he toyed with the idea of selling her the Austrian rights over Schleswig-Holstein for 60-70 million guelders. It never occurred to him to envisage a reform of the German Confederation in accordance with national idears; for he despised nationalism as one of the modern enthusiasms which, especially in Germany, had little real depth. He did not, therefore, expect a war to make much difference to the existing order in Germany. An extention of territory in the old style--perhaps a bit of Silesia--was the most he hoped for; and if the war went badly, he was ready to agree to a division of Germany, in which Prussia would receive the North, and the game would go on between two states, as it had gone on since the time of Frederick the Great. The system created by the Congress of Vienna seemed to him, in the nature of things, the best: it was to the interest of all monarchs, including the King of Prussia, to preserve it. Thus, while Bismarck was drafting a new German Constitution which allowed for the active co-operation of the German people, Esterhazy made no appeal to enlightened opinion in Germany. He himself had no ideas on Germany's future, for his ideal lay in the past; and Austria therefore embarked on the War of 1866 without a German programme. In fact, Esterhazy was afraid of too decisive an Austrian victory, because he could not visualize any European system except that of the Congress of Vienna. He said himself: "The stakes are too high for me; for whether we win or whether we lose, the result of the war will be a different Austria from the one we know."
内牛满面……这才几年啊，贵族家的对普政策就如此抽搐（喂！），最后简直就是莫名其妙打了一场莫名其妙就被赶走了（喂喂
看着埃斯特哈齐先生紧跟梅公脚步，不由想起了把这段时期的贵族处理成希望路德不死不活的恶役的文，虽然照埃斯特哈齐亲王和梅公的观点看来的确该是如此，但我还是觉得把国家等同于上司实在不公平。也许这就是厨的私心，我始终觉得他就是那些希求同时得到两个世界里最好的东西，然而最后被两个世界同时抛弃的真正失败者（等等啊你）。跟随着神罗皇冠而来的那些虚空的荣耀，只不过是蜡烛在墙上投下的巨大影子，在失去了神罗之后，那些虚空的荣耀与权力也跟着一样一样丢掉，直到WW1之后，所有曾经认为是他手足发肤的部分都被扯去或者自己离他而去，回到离开瓦修的时候那样弱小没用的自己。普奥战争和战后的奥匈合并，只是逐渐回归到一无所有的自己途中的一步而已吧。
然而因为习惯于神罗带来的虚空荣耀而住在自己幻想的世界里的高岭之花贵族，我可真喜欢啊……Habsburg pride什么的，真萌啊（你够了！
Actually there were only five regiments [in Bohemia], two of them Italian, and therefore unreliable.
小伊你家军队的名声……（爆笑
At one Mensdorff protested. Premature measures would give Purssia the chance of accusing Austria of arming for an offensive war without really increasing Austria's military security, for a well-prepared attack would make short work of the handful of fresh troops in Bohemia. But Mensdorff's opposition was brushed aside. ... There was no agrressive intention behind the precautions taken by the generals. They were driven by anxiety to provocative measures; and in the Imperial counsels the obligations of honor and the traditions of the Monarchy outweighed all other arguments.
... Francis Joseph could honestly say that he was only seeking to defend his empire. It seemed best to present to Prussia the direct question which the Emperor might expect from King William. Karolyi was therefore instructed to ask Bismarck: “Whether the Court of Berlin really intended to tear up the Treaty of Gastein and to break the peace, sanctified by law, between the German federal states?" （还真是见过傻的没见过这么傻的，你问了人家就会回答你实话么！人家答了你就真的相信么！真是见过傻的没见过下略……）At the same time Austria tried to get into touch with the lesser German states and re-establish the friendships broken by her direct negotiations with Prussia over the fate of Schleswig-Holstein. A Circular Note was despatched to the German Courts to the effect that Austria would place the Schleswig-Holstein question in the hand of the German Diet, if the Prussian reply to Karolyi's question was unsatisfactory.
Bismarck at once made the most of his enemy's mistake. He was finding it difficult to porvoke the King to any decisive step, for Prussia was as anxious as Austria to avoid appearing as the aggressor in the eyes of Europe; now Austria had saved him any further trouble. Beust, when he saw the Austrian Circular, at once declared it to be useless; Prussia could easily deny aggressive intentions without altering her plans. （是啊人家萨叔家人都看出来这一点了……难怪博叔后来跑去贵族家当宰相了，这么看来在萨叔家时候就对贵族家恨铁不成钢了←喂！） When on March 16 Karolyi asked his question, with the polite assurance that it was not meant as a challenge, Bismarck answered short and sharp, "No!" [According to private information Bismarck added: he would give the same answer, if he were already drafting a declaration of war.] （宰相大人您……我……TOT都觉得贵族家那边傻透了对吧ToT）In a certain sense this was true, for the question and answer were not concerned with Bismarck's plans, but with the will of the King; and William certainly did not intend to attack Austria.
说实话第一次看宰相大人想方设法把战争责任推到贵族头上然后激自家国王宣战，而贵族方面蠢透了居然直接去问的时候俺的BLX哗啦一声就碎了，不过看多了也就萌起来了（……）
因为俺自己是个笨蛋，所以对政治上那些手腕来回总觉得很麻烦（……），也不想在文或者脑补里涉及太多。所以一见就像块楔子一样砸进心里，现在也反复在心里回放的普奥战争，还是sango那段生下来就背错了星象的那谁和我们可以让你看得更明白的那谁。
以下为序言的摘抄/翻译：
德意志奥地利人的地位本质上就是希求同时占据两个世界顶端的欲望——同时在德意志与奥地利帝国占据领导地位。正如Friedjung所说，德意志奥地利问题是十九世纪初民族主义萌芽的直接后果；在那之前，德意志奥地利人既是德意志（更准确地说，神圣罗马帝国）的一部分，同时又与其他许多民族有所联系，并不存在任何矛盾或是异常。但是，法国大革命影响深厚的遗产，即国家需要建立在民族基础上这一思想，深深摇撼了德意志奥地利人地位的根基。梅特涅很清楚，民族主义会毁了奥地利帝国，也正因为如此，他在1815年人们向弗朗茨皇帝献上德意志皇冠的时候说服皇帝拒绝；梅特涅有意为不建立在民族基础上的奥地利帝国铺平道路，因此也就违背了建立民族主义德意志的希求，并阻止了这一进程。
但在1848革命失败之后，德意志奥地利人犯了一个致命的错误。他们放弃了与王朝的斗争，转而支持哈布斯堡王朝。王朝到处都取得了辉煌的胜利，站出来反对它看起来已经完全无用了；德意志奥地利人就带着这种短视的微妙心理转而支持帝国，盼望着有一天他们能成为哈布斯堡王朝的后继者，就像法国大革命曾是波旁王朝的后继者一样。因此，他们相信支持哈布斯堡王朝的权力就是为他们自己好。他们任由自己的民族情感被转化为与普鲁士之间的王朝家族争执，自由主义思潮也被帝国所谓革命摧毁了其他民族的传统权利的理论所迷惑。
德意志奥地利人仍然处于失败后的震惊与迷惘之中；他们再也不能不检视自己身处的地位，不能再随波逐流，对他们来说，决定自己未来真正想要的是什么成了越来越紧迫的问题。他们已经失去了在奥地利帝国内的统治地位，但还能收获身为一个大帝国的一份子的好处，他们尚未准备好看着帝国在德意志民族主义的名义下被摧毁；对他们来说，在帝国之内最糟糕的事情就是，他们可能被放到与波西米亚的捷克人同等的地位上，而在一个统一的德意志帝国里，他们则必定不得不屈服于普鲁士人。德意志奥地利人仍然想要保住奥地利帝国，但并不准备为了帝国利益牺牲自己的民族主义情绪，成为纯粹的奥地利人，与其他任何种族的奥地利人合作。几个世纪以来德意志民族的统治地位并不是那么容易推翻的，而德意志奥地利人仍在试图得到两个世界里最好的东西。
德意志奥地利人不会恢复他们曾希求的在德意志与奥地利的统治地位，但他们将成为中间的连接线，两个帝国间不可缺少的联系，他们分裂的忠诚将不再是软弱的来源，而成为维系整个合作结构的力量。
[捷克语和德语同时成为波西米亚官方语言]语言条例背后的考虑与Taaffe政府背后的动机是一样的——如果要让捷克人保持忠诚，必须安抚他们，而德意志人必须保持忠诚，因为他们要担心还会有更糟的事情落到他们头上。
Badeni的失败让弗朗茨·约瑟夫坚信，任何积极的建设性政策都会引来反对，甚至可能让整栋帝国大厦轰然倒塌。弗朗茨·约瑟夫已经是位老人了，他最主要的担忧就是让帝国在他活着的时候不要崩溃；他采取了谨慎小心、毫不冒进的政策，这种权宜之计的确保障了帝国继续生存，但却只不过是一个空壳，袭来的第一场风暴就会将其摧毁。
[梅特涅及其保守派同僚]憎恨自由主义因为它威胁到他们的地位，但也因为它威胁到了奥地利帝国，他们相信，帝国还有更重要的功能要发挥。帝国已经失去了原本的立足理由——为欧洲抵抗土耳其人；而梅特涅提供的另一个理由，为欧洲抵抗法国与革命，也已经因十九世纪的政治发展而成为一句谎言（如果曾经竟还不是谎言的话）。帝国需要一个新的立足点，需要发挥新的功能，开明的奥地利人相信他们在推进经济发展的政策中找到了这一功能。
事实上，要说正是弗朗茨·约瑟夫本人，在摧毁帝国方面做的贡献比谁都大，是毫不夸张的。在他统治的这些年里，他唯一关心的就是自己的军事力量与自己在海外的声名。据记载，他曾对西奥多·罗斯福说过：“你能在我身上看到最后一个老派皇帝。”他没说错，他的确是最后一个相信人民的责任就是为王朝牺牲一切，而王朝并没有责任为人民做任何事的皇帝，也是最后一个在自己对子民的责任方面做得时松时紧的皇帝，因为他相信自己不受任何普通标准的约束。弗朗茨二世，在听人描述一位奥地利爱国者的时候，回答说：“他对我是否足够忠诚？”弗朗茨·约瑟夫甚至从不问这样的问题，因为他从来想不到世上竟能有一种对奥地利的爱国主义不同于对他个人的忠诚。王朝本身自然代表了横跨民族区分的帝国元素；但，正如玛丽亚·特蕾西亚与约瑟夫二世所认识到的，只有当王朝为子民谋福利的时候才能成为凝聚不同民族的力量。弗朗茨·约瑟夫则一味专心于王朝的利益，采取短视的政策联合占统治地位的民族以求确保自己的军事力量，这就耗尽了他从力求改革的先人那里继承得来的对于帝国的忠诚。弗朗茨·约瑟夫对他的子民只知索取，却不给任何回报；那么，到了他统治的末期，他的子民已经失去了对帝国的任何兴趣，也是不可避免的事情了。
“我希望对手是一名英国上校！”
“为什么要一个英国人？”加米里问道。
“我只要让他嗅到我们罗马尼亚的佳肴，他就会心甘情愿地自己走进我们的俘虏营。”
“噢，你情绪不高！”二级下士冲我大吼，“我会让你这个笨蛋立刻行动起来，你这个软弱的维也纳佬儿，好让你明白，你是在哪里！”
“我已经注意到了，二级下士先生！”
“那么你也知道，你到普鲁士人这儿是来干什么的？”
“是的，二级下士先生，我要成为一名军人！”
“是成为一名普鲁士军人！”
“是成为一名军人，二级下士先生！”
“普鲁士人才是真正的军人！”
“二级下士先生，在普鲁士存在之前，奥地利已经有军人了！”
——亲眼见证了水和油是怎么炸锅的，笑得滚来滚去……（喂
对我来说，受雇于德意志帝国去扛枪打仗的普鲁士人是一个有骑士信念的集体，在这种意义上，你能够也必须成为普鲁士人，而且要尊重你为之服务过的集体规则。在这个范围之内我会鼓励你发展个性，正像你说过的，在普鲁士人存在之前，奥地利人已经是战士了，而且正如我见到的，他们今天仍是战士——那么我很乐意学习他们的经验。
只有那些缺乏理智的蠢货和夸夸其谈的人，那些对普鲁士人刻意模仿的人，那些失去了自己的语言和特色的人，才会嘲笑和贬低奥地利人拥有的独特的东西，因为它们是如此与众不同，我甚至因此更加喜欢奥地利人，他们为我们带来了变化、乐曲、崭新的颜色和光线，使我们不至于陷入千篇一律的单调之中。
“至此为止我一直认为这一切都是理所当然的，死亡也是这样，我曾以为自己已经战胜了死亡！”
“普鲁士人懂得好好地死！”
“你们奥地利人，好好地活？”
“是的，你们更勇敢，我们更顽强。”
完食，感想是我再也不想看到二战小说，尤其是写东线的小说了……TAT
你在我的军服和衬衫之间瑟瑟发抖，趴在我的胸脯上，再也不想走开——你干脆把我变成了你的主人。
……
我是前沿观察员，你当然和我在一起。当第一只大口径炮弹呼啸着飞来时，你学着匍匐前进并且进入了洼地里的掩蔽体。进攻一结束，你就爬回来，舔着我的脸，你这狗呵，快乐地摇着尾巴。一切都好——什么事也没有！
他以这一切展示着一个不把敌人和死亡看在眼里的普鲁士军官的姿态。
他感受到恐惧这说明他有足够的智慧，但他也有足够的镇静去克服恐惧。
在俄国，他继续他的骑士游戏——很快，头部负伤倒下了。在死神的怀抱里，他还不屑地微笑着，感到自己被人欺骗了，成了别人违反游戏规则的卑鄙行为的牺牲品。
……
在这一点上，这些普鲁士军官失败了。波茨坦最后的骑士们死在了斯大林格勒，直到自杀他们也没有向敌人屈服，也没有俯就屈尊去学习如何理解和适应一个可鄙的世界。
I'm not broken
