Koeniggraetz
There can be no doubt that a retreat to Olmuetz or beyond, however disgraceful, was the right policy. ... but it would not have accorded with the traditions of the house of Habsburg. Ferdinand II encompassed by the rebels, Maria Theresa in conflict with all the armies of the Continent, Francis in his ceaseless wars against Napoleon, all had put their fortunes to the test on the battlefield, however unfavourable the circumstances. Austria's position in Europe did not rest so much on great victories as on her defensive strength. She had not lost provinces, but only after long and fierce resistance. Never did she abandon a position without a struggle as Prussia did at Olmuetz, or as Russia was to do at the Congress of Berlin. There was in Austria no articulate public opinion, and the determining factor was therefore the honour of the empire and the dynasty; a ruling house, especially when it is sure of the allegiance of its subjects, will always prefer a battle to a voluntary humiliation.
Prussia Headquarters were far from confident; it was clear that the centre was making no headway, and the troops who had been on the march since early morning with nothing but a cup of coffee to sustain them could hardly be expected to withstand a powerful counter-attack. ... Bismarck related later that, noticing that Moltke had run out of cigars, he offered him his own case, with the two last cigars in it; he was relieved to see that Moltke carefully examined them and chose the better one. （好可爱！不知为何就是觉得喝了一杯咖啡就去打仗的普君很萌！信心十足挑一根好烟的Moltke也好萌！）
The Austrian army was, however, as much shaken by its own loss of morale as it could have been by any Prussian pursuit. The cavalry could rightly feel they had done as well as the enemy, and the artillery had shown itself definitely superior; but the infantry had lost faith in everything--in their weapons, in their leaders, in their tactics, and in themselves. None could be braver than the Austrian infantry in attack, but there their enegy was exhausted and during the retreat they lost all discipline.
The Austrian army had fought bravely and honourably to the last: there was no Austrian collapse after Koeniggraetz like the French collapse after Rossbach or the Prussian collapse after Jena, and the victor was left almost as exhausted as the vanquished. （到哪儿都是慢吞吞的，到哪儿都是pride的问题，果然是这家伙的作风么orz……话说回来，打赢之后忘了趁胜追击，在原地一圈一圈打转欢庆胜利的普君家军队也很可爱啊）
French Intervention
Austria, the Prince said, was cringing in defeat, but revengeful in victory, and would exact a heavy retribution at the first opportunity unless she was crushed completely. （跟你没完不愧是跟你没完……）
Bismarck therefore grasped all the more eagerly at a new weapon to force Austria to a speedy peace. He sent for the Hungarian exile, General Klapka, and told him that the organisation of a Hungarian legion was to be seriously undertaken; the Hungarian prisoners were to be transferred to Silesia and there Klapka was to try to recuit them for an invasion of Hungary. Bismarck declared that he did not aim at the destruction of Austria, but only at a rapid conclusion of peace; but since he anticipated further fighting, he was ready to give the Hungarian a chance to show that their boasts were not empty words. （哇靠搞了半天最后进攻匈牙利的是匈牙利军团啊！顿时脑补了反骨咖喱男！这可真美味啊……）
Bismarck and Moltke realised that the nearer they got to Vienna the higher would be the final reward of victory.
The Emperor's principal anxiety was Hungary, for the German and Slav lands, despite their complaints, never refused further sacrifices of blood and money. （从内心变态的一面来说，很喜欢这样的抖M贵族啊……）
当中一段萨多瓦战败对贵族的影响看的时候在煮面，暂时就不摘了（……），等有空再来记录。但是这句一定要记下：
Austria found herself deserted, in a position best described by a French lady who said to Vitzthum: "Do you know what history will say? I will whisper it in your ear: When virtuous Austria finally decided to yield to Napoleon's wishes, she found only an Abelard--after the operation." （一口血喷出来，你们……你们……这尺度比同人还要大啊！）
Bismarck had offered over and over again to share Germany with Austria. It may be doubted whether these offers were sincere; now, at any rate, they ceased. （就算是自找的，还是会觉得虐，果然是厨的溺爱心理么……TvT，即使总有一种想把他折腾得直接入土为安[喂]的冲动，也会觉得虐啊> <）
Meanwhile [on July 23] a swarm of German princes and ministers hastened to Vienna to beg for protection. （笑死了……不知为何就是觉得很好笑，而且Pfordten先生自己当时不也是反奥的嘛，萨叔家却没人来求援……）
可恶的Esterhazy！TOT，代表贵族家财政部（喂）并作为热爱土豆家族的奥厨在内心诅咒一下Esterhazy先生TOT，哭了啊……因为陷入了祥林嫂般的情绪中所以贵族宁愿再继续打也不肯让普君拿走萨叔一片土地的部分也就不摘录了，虽然萨克森奥还是很萌（被揍）
On the conclusion of the armistice the [Hungarian] legion was officially dissolved, but on Bismarck's instruction it remained in existence, and on August 3 it embarked on the invasion of Hungary. The invasion did not proceed very far. There was not the slightest sign of a popular insurrection agaist the Austrian rule, and on August 6 the legion of Klapka hastily recrossed the Hungarian frontier without having fired a shot.
（脑补：
“你不是成天说不怕你姐的嘛，拿出行动来啊！”
“切，我干嘛要怕她……给我军队啊，给我军队老子立刻就打给你看！”
“事先说好了本大爷可没想把小少爷揍到死啊，半死不活就够了，你给我留着点手。”
“要你说？老子也没恨他到非要杀了他，只是不喜欢他跟我姐老腻在一起。那家伙哪点好了？到底哪点好啊，真想不通她想些什么……”
“行啊你自己去征兵吧，战俘营里边那么多匈牙利人呢你就振臂高呼去吧，本大爷看弟弟去了~”
“切，奶孩子去吧，胆小鬼。”
“……不是我不想揍你，可你看起来也不怎么需要我揍了嘛？哟，这刀划得挺漂亮，谁干的？”
“混蛋保皇党……总有一天老子要把那小少爷踩在脚底下！当着她的面！”
“桀桀桀桀本大爷很理解你这种心情啊！去吧去吧，小心你姐的锅子就成。都随你吃随你喝那么久了，可别说本大爷不够意思！”
“啰嗦！走啦~你就看着吧~”
三天以后顶着满头包回来了，“再也不管死老姐啦T皿T！”
完。[被揍）
完食，Conclusion一章看得眼泪汪汪……Benedek最后的日子太惨了，Friedjung写得真是感情充沛（抹泪），nice普奥同人（被揍了
Prussian Reform Plan
The Times wrote arrogantly: "The inference from these proceedings is that there is a fair chance the peace of Europe will not be violated. As for the precise degree in which the honour of the two antagonists is preserved, we profess very little anxiety indeed. The truth is the nature of the transaction leaves very little honour to be devided between these two great monarchies, for the quarrel is most vulgar, commonplace, and discreditable. ... The question is like most German quarrels; it rises into some degree of interest as soon as there is a chance of either party coming to blows, and subsides into tameness and insipidity as soon as the crisis has passed away."
As late as May 7 Gerlach wrote in the Kreuzzeitung in his remarkable style: "The Prussian demand for an expansion of power in Germany is justified; but so also is the Austrian appeal for the preservation of her power in Germany. This dualism is the vital basis, the real foundation, of the German Constitution. Germany ceases to be Germany without Prussia or without Austria. Prussia's hounour and power are therefore the pride of Germany, and Austria's honour and power are the pride of Prussia. To injure Prussia is to injure Austria, and to injure Austria is to injure Prussia." （目からジャガイモ……） Such appeals to tradition and to the days of the Holy Alliance were bound to have their effect on the King; and in the army, too, voices were raised against war with Austria, the old comrade-in-arms.
Throughout April feeling in Austria had been growing more bitter. With Prussia in alliance with Italy and demanding the exclusion of Austria from Germany war seemed inevitable. Peace could be had at a price; but Austria was too proud to surrender Schleswig-Holstein and acknowledge Prussian srpremacy in North Germany. The Germans in Austria were doubly embittered by this unjustifiable aggression; for if Bismarck succeeded they would be excluded from their German Fatherland. They would be the hardest hit by a German civil war, and all, liberals and clericals alike, hated the Prussian minister. The Slavs added to the hatred of Prussia their general hatred of everything German. The Magyars alone remained detached; but they too desired a war, because they hoped that it would compel the Monarchy to grant them their ancient liberties in return for their help. （扶额……所以说要不要这么抽搐啊）
Nevertheless it was Austria who precipitated the tragic drama of 1866. ... It has often been asked who was responsible for the Austrian measures which inevitably provoked war, but no satisfactory answer has been given. None of the ministers who advised the premature mobilisation which gave Italy and Prussia a pretext for war ever gave an explanation of their policy, chiefly because of their feeling for the Monarchy; they were anxious to avoid seperating the Emperor's share in events from their own. This sentiment was peculiar to Austria. In Prussia dynastic feeling was just as deeply rooted; yet there was no hesitation in examining the characters of Frederick William IV, William I, Frederick III, and William II. William I's share in the war of 1866 was fully analysed during his lifetime by some of his closest advisers; the King himself was often able to read that he had not the creative power of his great minister. In Austria such a thing was impossible; the personality of the head of the House of Habsburg was surrounded, during his lifetime, with a dim religious light, and any discussion of him as an historical character was forbidden by a powerful tradition, which went back to the days of Holy Roman Empire. It was bound up with the feeling that Austria-Hungary depended more than any other empire on the awe and respect felt for the Dynasty. This silence made the study of contemporary history difficult, but in the eyes of the leading statesmen that did not matter; it strengthened the foundations of the empire. （所谓南辕北辙还真是……不过贵族你跟普君也南辕北辙跟大姐也南辕北辙，到底是……orz。说实话看着各家国内都对开战争论不断犹豫不决，真是劳心劳力啊……）
On April 26, when it had been decided by the generals to mobilise on the northern front, Esterhazy writes to Mensdorff: "Our enemies have achieved their object. We are arming--and for a prolonged peace, which will probably compel us to fire the first shot! ... This war cannot be a defensive war, or still less a conservative war for us. You can console yourself with the thought that you have struggled bravely and with self-control for peace to the very last moment."
Friedjung may have lacked certain details or may even occasionally have been misinformed, but he went to the root of the matter when he pointed to the complete lack of co-ordination between the Ministers and the generals as the source of all Austria's mistakes and misfortunes.
Plans of Campaign. Benedek and Krismanic. Negotiations for the Surrender of Venice.
The Austrian generals had insisted on mobilisation, not because they were confident of victory, but because they doubted the military strength of the Empire. Just before the battle of Koeniggraetz, Mensdorff confessed to Motley that during the negotiations between Berlin and Vienna "the military authorities were very dissatisfied, and from the very start of the campaign expected their inadequate preparations to result in grave disaster". ... It is completely untrue that the Austrian generals were in favour of war in 1866 because they overrated the strength of the army. It was the diplomats who underrated the dangers. This situation recurs throughout Austrian history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in the wars against the French Republic and Napoleon. （所以说……这到底是图个啥啊= =）
Those responsible for Austrian policy between 1792 and 1866 were convinced that Austria, as the protector of conservative ideas, must always be ready to fight innovators and disturbers of the peace. But modern ideas were stronger than treaty rights, as the men of 1859 and 1866 had to learn. It is always dangerous for a state to think itself called upon to defend an ideal or divine order of things throughout the world, instead of putting its own interests first. （虽然不觉得那谁这么无私，不过单就这点表述上来看，还真是跟某时期的亲分一模一样……该说这是哈布斯堡血脉作祟吗？orz）... [Esterhazy and Biegeleben] did not realise that a storm was sweeping throughout Europe--a storm which was to destroy the German Confederation, the temporal power of the Papacy, and with them Austria's predominance in Germany, in Italy, and over Hungary. （所以说，时代不一样啦，落后于时代的小少爷。）
According to his own account, Bismarck made a further proposal: "I proposed that, fully equipped as we were, we should turn against France and compel her to surrender Alsace; Austria could then have had Strasburg and Prussia Mainz. ... Napoleon, with his army weak and demoralised by the Mexican expedition, could not have resisted." （虽然很对不起法叔，但是真的很想笑啊……有什么问题解决不了了就去打法叔么）
The Austrian attitude was fundamentally inconsistent: at the beginning of May the outlook had been so black that it had been decided to buy off Italy with the offer of Venice; since then nothing had changed except the mood of the Austrian Cabinet. The dilettantism with which the Belcredi Cabinet faced its problem, both at home and abroad, lay at the root of the evil. The internal situation should have made the ministers avoid war at all costs; instead they welcomed war as the solution of all their difficulties. （贵族你真是够了！上司们也真是够了！扶额……就说了要不要这么抽搐啊……在战术上倒是很不抽搐，完全不知变通嘛=。=）
Austria thus lost Venice whatever happened, and, if she was victorious, Napoleon was bound to benefit, even if he did not gain any territory. In return Austria received practically nothing; it was soon clear that she was not even assured of Italian neutrality. There was only a clause, by which the Austrian Cabinet set great store, guaranteeing the present possessions of the Holy See, and even allowing that under certain circumstances the Pope should regain his lost territory, the Marches and the Legations. ... But under no circumstances was the House of Habsburg to profit. The Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were never to return to their ancient possessions; at the most they might hope for compensation in Germany. Napoleon did not expect any reaction in Italy in favour of the Pope or of the Bourbons; but the strongly Clerical statesmen of Austria regarded this clause as a real achievement. The Austrian army in Italy would not be fighting for Austria, or even for the dynasty, but simply to secure for the peoples of Central Italy the right to rise in favour of the Pope. （何必呢你……= =||||）
Beust, who saw the treaty later, described it as the most incredible document he had ever seen, and we can only agree with him.
Bismarck was very annoyed at Manteuffel's moderation. "If only there had been an exchange of shots", he said impatiently to the Italian minister. But as La Marmora observed with justice: "I do not see how Manteuffel chould have fired on the Austrians, when they had retreated without fighting."
Bismarck exclaimed: "Our troops are even now marching into Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse. It will be a bloody struggle and perhaps Prussia will succumb, but whatever happens she will fight bravely and honourably. If we are defeated I shall not return here; I shall die in the last charge. You can only die once and death is better than defeat." （突然想起了前阵子看的小说……果然是好好地死么……）
The War of 1866 decisively settled the German question, because Austria accepted it as a final verdict on the history of three hundred years. This was the price of the long suppression of all freedom of thought and conscience which had followed the expulsion of the Protestants; exiles like Kepler and Amos Comenius could not be replaced by the pupils of the Jesuits. The province south of the Danube had been the only part of Germany to escape the ravages of the Thirty Years' War, but they had declined spiritually and economically ever since, while the rest of Germany had been slowly recovering. In consequence, when Maria Theresa and Joseph II set themselves to restore a shattered Austria, they had been hampered everywhere by the lack of competent assistants; in spite of this they had given the Monarchy such a renewal of strength that it had been able to withstand the storm of the French Revolution, while the Prussia of Frederick the Great had collapsed after Jena. But then under Francis I the empire had relapsed disastrously into the policy of repression. （萌哭了……曾经在不幸当中成了仅存的幸运儿，日后就要承受补偿这种幸运的不幸啊，这样的奥神罗真棒……[被揍了）
又看了点军事情况……贵族你这个平时没有预备役到了打起来了才开始慢吞吞地试图征预备役、家里的将领只会打防守反击一种战术的家伙，真是没救了（喂
[普奥]2、Die Wetterfahne 风向标
我心爱女郎的屋顶上，有一个风向标，
风儿恣意摆弄它的方向。
我的眼里它却是，
命运摆弄的无常。
要是他肯抬起眼睛，
把目光投在屋顶上。
他就会懂得，这女郎的忠诚
永远也不用指望。
风儿在屋顶恣意摆弄着心，
就像在屋子里一样，却没人知道。
我为什么要痛苦？很快她就是个
有钱的新娘。
另外，更严重的是就算单箭头，也满脑子都是贵族单箭头别人的病，谁来（ry……
今天看了饥荒背景下的英爱，真想看圣帕特里克时期或者1916的英爱英啊……（你够了！
Preparations for War
In embarking on negotiations with Italy, the King quietened his conscience with the assurance that they committed him to nothing, so long as he remained open to a compromise and did not present an ultimatum to Austria. Bismarck did not contradict his master; for he too would have preferred a voluntary surrender by Austria of supremacy in Northern Germany. But he was certain that Habsburg pride would prefer defeat to a voluntary surrender （内牛满面TvT）, and, more clear-sighted than the King, saw that the Italian alliance was a first step which would inevitably lead to war. Peace could only be maintained if the King moderated his claims, or gave way, as his brother Frederick William IV had done in 1850. But in 1850 William I too had preferred Olmutz to a war; and in consequence Bismarck's opponents at court fully expected the King to draw back at the last moment.
The result of the Prussian Council of Feburary 28 remained for the moment secret; had Austria known that William was negotiating with Italy and France to secure the overlordship of North Germany, she would at once have prepared to meet the threat. But a good deal was learnt of the Prussian plans through the personal relationships which connected the Prussian and the Austrian Courts （不是我说什么……personal relationships什么的，一家人就是分家也分不干净是吧）and from Bismarck himself, who made no secret of his intentions or of the King's opposition; but Austria had isolated herself during the Crimean War, and she seemed to have lost the art of winning allies. （每次看到众叛亲离没人要的贵族，俺都充满抖M的萌感……） Buol had left a grievous inheritance; and after his fall Austrian policy had changed almost every six months under the influence of first one minister and then another. Since the Meeting of the Princes at Frankfort Austrian policy had passed throught every gradation from a proud assertion of supremacy to a close alliance with Prussia, and was now back again on the verge of a quarrel. None of the leading men had been given time to carry a policy through to a finish. Schmerling's plans had been upset by Rechberg; and the influence of Schemerling and of Biegeleben had brought Rechberg down when he had almost succeeded in restoring the alliance with Prussia. Now Esterhazy was supreme; but he, unlike Schmerling and Rechberg, had no definite plan and could never pursue any one policy for long. The Cabinet of Vienna thus continued to be swayed to and fro by contradictory hopes and fears. （这还真是抖M啊……）
[Mensdorff, the Foreign Minister] "I did not invent the stupid Schleswig-Holstein question and am suffering for the sins of past years. Whether we shall get out of this most tedious of tedious questions without a conflict I cannot yet say..."
Esterhazy saw the possibilities of the situations clearly--too clearly, indeed; for Austria needed a man of decision, and not one who was torn by doubts. ... He regared the period of the Holy Alliance as the happiest in European history and therefore disliked the thought of a war between two of the conservative powers. He would rather have come to some agreement with Prussia regarding the supremacy in Germany; and he toyed with the idea of selling her the Austrian rights over Schleswig-Holstein for 60-70 million guelders. It never occurred to him to envisage a reform of the German Confederation in accordance with national idears; for he despised nationalism as one of the modern enthusiasms which, especially in Germany, had little real depth. He did not, therefore, expect a war to make much difference to the existing order in Germany. An extention of territory in the old style--perhaps a bit of Silesia--was the most he hoped for; and if the war went badly, he was ready to agree to a division of Germany, in which Prussia would receive the North, and the game would go on between two states, as it had gone on since the time of Frederick the Great. The system created by the Congress of Vienna seemed to him, in the nature of things, the best: it was to the interest of all monarchs, including the King of Prussia, to preserve it. Thus, while Bismarck was drafting a new German Constitution which allowed for the active co-operation of the German people, Esterhazy made no appeal to enlightened opinion in Germany. He himself had no ideas on Germany's future, for his ideal lay in the past; and Austria therefore embarked on the War of 1866 without a German programme. In fact, Esterhazy was afraid of too decisive an Austrian victory, because he could not visualize any European system except that of the Congress of Vienna. He said himself: "The stakes are too high for me; for whether we win or whether we lose, the result of the war will be a different Austria from the one we know."
内牛满面……这才几年啊，贵族家的对普政策就如此抽搐（喂！），最后简直就是莫名其妙打了一场莫名其妙就被赶走了（喂喂
看着埃斯特哈齐先生紧跟梅公脚步，不由想起了把这段时期的贵族处理成希望路德不死不活的恶役的文，虽然照埃斯特哈齐亲王和梅公的观点看来的确该是如此，但我还是觉得把国家等同于上司实在不公平。也许这就是厨的私心，我始终觉得他就是那些希求同时得到两个世界里最好的东西，然而最后被两个世界同时抛弃的真正失败者（等等啊你）。跟随着神罗皇冠而来的那些虚空的荣耀，只不过是蜡烛在墙上投下的巨大影子，在失去了神罗之后，那些虚空的荣耀与权力也跟着一样一样丢掉，直到WW1之后，所有曾经认为是他手足发肤的部分都被扯去或者自己离他而去，回到离开瓦修的时候那样弱小没用的自己。普奥战争和战后的奥匈合并，只是逐渐回归到一无所有的自己途中的一步而已吧。
然而因为习惯于神罗带来的虚空荣耀而住在自己幻想的世界里的高岭之花贵族，我可真喜欢啊……Habsburg pride什么的，真萌啊（你够了！
Actually there were only five regiments [in Bohemia], two of them Italian, and therefore unreliable.
小伊你家军队的名声……（爆笑
At one Mensdorff protested. Premature measures would give Purssia the chance of accusing Austria of arming for an offensive war without really increasing Austria's military security, for a well-prepared attack would make short work of the handful of fresh troops in Bohemia. But Mensdorff's opposition was brushed aside. ... There was no agrressive intention behind the precautions taken by the generals. They were driven by anxiety to provocative measures; and in the Imperial counsels the obligations of honor and the traditions of the Monarchy outweighed all other arguments.
... Francis Joseph could honestly say that he was only seeking to defend his empire. It seemed best to present to Prussia the direct question which the Emperor might expect from King William. Karolyi was therefore instructed to ask Bismarck: “Whether the Court of Berlin really intended to tear up the Treaty of Gastein and to break the peace, sanctified by law, between the German federal states?" （还真是见过傻的没见过这么傻的，你问了人家就会回答你实话么！人家答了你就真的相信么！真是见过傻的没见过下略……）At the same time Austria tried to get into touch with the lesser German states and re-establish the friendships broken by her direct negotiations with Prussia over the fate of Schleswig-Holstein. A Circular Note was despatched to the German Courts to the effect that Austria would place the Schleswig-Holstein question in the hand of the German Diet, if the Prussian reply to Karolyi's question was unsatisfactory.
Bismarck at once made the most of his enemy's mistake. He was finding it difficult to porvoke the King to any decisive step, for Prussia was as anxious as Austria to avoid appearing as the aggressor in the eyes of Europe; now Austria had saved him any further trouble. Beust, when he saw the Austrian Circular, at once declared it to be useless; Prussia could easily deny aggressive intentions without altering her plans. （是啊人家萨叔家人都看出来这一点了……难怪博叔后来跑去贵族家当宰相了，这么看来在萨叔家时候就对贵族家恨铁不成钢了←喂！） When on March 16 Karolyi asked his question, with the polite assurance that it was not meant as a challenge, Bismarck answered short and sharp, "No!" [According to private information Bismarck added: he would give the same answer, if he were already drafting a declaration of war.] （宰相大人您……我……TOT都觉得贵族家那边傻透了对吧ToT）In a certain sense this was true, for the question and answer were not concerned with Bismarck's plans, but with the will of the King; and William certainly did not intend to attack Austria.
说实话第一次看宰相大人想方设法把战争责任推到贵族头上然后激自家国王宣战，而贵族方面蠢透了居然直接去问的时候俺的BLX哗啦一声就碎了，不过看多了也就萌起来了（……）
因为俺自己是个笨蛋，所以对政治上那些手腕来回总觉得很麻烦（……），也不想在文或者脑补里涉及太多。所以一见就像块楔子一样砸进心里，现在也反复在心里回放的普奥战争，还是sango那段生下来就背错了星象的那谁和我们可以让你看得更明白的那谁。
I'm not broken
